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Abstract: To inform the UK antimicrobial resistance strategy, a risk assessment was undertaken of 20 
the likelihood, over a five-year time-frame, of the emergence and widespread dissemination of 21 
pan-drug-resistant (PDR) Gram-negative bacteria that would pose a major public health threat by 22 
compromising effective healthcare delivery. Subsequent impact over five and 20-year time-frames 23 
was assessed in terms of morbidity and mortality attributable to PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia. 24 
A Bayesian approach, combining available data with expert prior opinion, was used to determine 25 
the probability of the emergence, persistence and spread of PDR bacteria. Overall probability was 26 
modelled using Monte Carlo simulation. Estimates of impact were also obtained using Bayesian 27 
methods. The estimated probability of widespread occurrence of PDR pathogens within five years 28 
was 0.2 (95% credibility interval [CrI]: 0.07-0.37). Estimated annual numbers of PDR Gram-negative 29 
bacteraemias at five and 20 years were 6,800 (95% CrI: 400-58,600) and 22,800 (95% CrI: 30 
1,500-160,000), respectively; corresponding estimates of excess deaths were 1,900 (95% CrI: 31 
0-23,000) and 6,400 (95% CrI: 0-64,000). Over 20 years, cumulative estimates indicate 284,000 (95% 32 
CrI: 17,000-1,990,000) cases of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia, leading to an estimated 79,000 33 
(95% CrI: 0-821,000) deaths. This risk assessment reinforces the need for urgent national and 34 
international action to tackle antibiotic resistance. 35 
Keywords: Antibiotic resistance; risk assessment; Bayesian modelling 36 
 37 
1. Introduction 38 
The emergence and spread of antibiotic resistance is a major threat to public health. Infections 39 
caused by resistant bacteria are associated with increased morbidity, mortality and economic cost 40 
[1]. Many advances in medical care have led, as an unintended consequence, to patients becoming 41 
more prone to infection involving opportunistic bacteria. Invasive procedures, immunosuppressive 42 
drugs, and the use of intravascular or urinary catheters all compromise the body’s natural barriers to 43 
infection. As a result, many patients rely on the therapeutic or prophylactic use of antibiotics to 44 
minimise the risk of opportunistic healthcare-associated infections. The widespread occurrence of 45 
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bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics thus threatens the routine management of patients in diverse 46 
clinical settings. In a worst-case setting, the proliferation of strains of bacteria resistant to all 47 
routinely available antibiotics, hereafter referred to as ‘pan-drug resistant’ (PDR) bacteria, would 48 
severely compromise many aspects of modern medicine. 49 
The global nature of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been highlighted in recent reports from 50 
Europe [2], the USA [3], Australia [4], and the WHO [5]. In the UK, the threat posed by resistance 51 
was emphasized in a report by the Chief Medical Officer [6] and led to the publication of a 5-year 52 
national strategy [7]. In support of this strategy, a risk assessment was undertaken of the likelihood 53 
of emergence and impact of the widespread occurrence of PDR bacteria, using elicitation of expert 54 
opinion [8] coupled with Bayesian statistical inference [9,10]. 55 
    56 
2. Results 57 
2.1. Probability of occurrence 58 
The consensus view of the expert panel was that PDR Gram-negative bacteria had already 59 
emerged in the UK, as evidenced by referral of PDR isolates to the national reference laboratory; 60 
therefore the probability Pr(emergence) from Equation (1) was set to one. The prior opinion from the 61 
expert panel on the two remaining terms in Equation (1), together with summary statistics from 62 
corresponding prior Beta distributions, are presented in Figure 1. 63 
With regard to probability of persistence (given emergence has occurred), analysis of data from 64 
the BSAC bacteraemia surveillance programme between 2001 and 2012 showed that while 65 
emergence of new resistance occurred in four Gram-negative pathogens, only one (carbapenem 66 
resistance in Acinetobacter spp.) exhibited persistence (Supplementary data Table S3a). In contrast, in 67 
35 instances of pre-existing resistance (inferring persistence), 14 exhibited spread, defined here as a 68 
peak annual proportion of resistance of at least 25% (Supplementary data Table S3a). It should be 69 
noted that this figure was close to the panel’s elicited estimate of 26% for the peak proportion of 70 
PDR. Combining this with the prior distributions in Table 1 yields posterior estimates (95% 71 
credibility intervals [CrI]) of 0.50 (0.18-0.82), and 0.40 (0.26-0.56) for the probabilities of persistence 72 
and spread, respectively. Taking the data on persistence into account led to a downwards revision of 73 
the prior estimate of 0.79 elicited from the panel (Table 1) to a posterior estimate of 0.5, whereas the 74 
estimate of spread remained largely unaffected by the data. Figure 2 presents the posterior 75 
distribution of the probability on the left hand side of Equation (1), obtained from Monte Carlo 76 
simulation. Based on this, the probability of occurrence of the scenario of PDR bacteria emerging, 77 
persisting and spreading as agents of bacteraemia within a 5-year interval was estimated to be 0.19 78 
(95% CrI: 0.07-0.37). 79 
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 80 
Figure 1. Prior distributions of the expert panel elicitation. 81 
Table 1: Prior distributions for persistence and spread elicited from the expert panel 82 
parameter 
Beta distribution  Percentiles 
𝛼 𝛽 mean variance  50 2.5 97.5 
Persistence 2.96 0.99 0.75 0.04  0.79 0.29 0.99 
Spread 1.46 1.72 0.46 0.06  0.45 0.05 0.91 
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 83 
Figure 2: Posterior distribution of the probability of the scenario occurring within 5 years 84 
2.2. Impact on Patients 85 
The estimated impact of the widespread occurrence of PDR Gram-negative bacteria using a 86 
variety of parameters is shown below. 87 
2.2.1. Number of Bacteraemias 88 
Following occurrence of the scenario, the cumulative numbers of PDR Gram-negative 89 
bacteraemias in the UK over five- and 20-year periods were predicted to lie between 1,100 and 90 
158,000 and 17,000 and 1,989,000, respectively (Table 2), the interval widths reflecting the combined 91 
uncertainty from the expert panel’s opinion and the available surveillance data. 92 
Table 2: Point and interval estimates for the annual and cumulative numbers of PDR Gram-negative 93 
bacteraemia in the UK for selected years of the scenario. 94 
Year median 95% CrI median 95% CrI 
1 1,200 70 – 7,400 1,200 70 – 7,400 
5 6,800 400 – 58,600 19,600 1,100 – 158,000 
10 14,300 800 – 114,000 77,800 4,400 – 614,000 
20 22,800 1,500 – 160,000 283,700 17,000 – 1,989,000 
2.2.2. Mortality 95 
As with the number of PDR bacteraemias, there was considerable uncertainty in the numbers of 96 
attributable deaths. These were cumulatively estimated over five and 20 year periods to be 1,900 97 
(95% CrI: 0-23,000) and 6,400 (95% CrI: 0-64,000), respectively (Table 3). 98 
Table 3: Point and interval estimates for the annual and cumulative numbers of deaths attributable 99 
to PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia in the UK for selected years of the scenario. 100 
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Year of 
scenario 
Annual Cumulative 
median 95% CrI median 95% CrI 
1 300 0 – 3,100 300 0 – 3,100 
5 1,900 0 – 23,000 5,500 0 – 63,000 
10 4,100 0 – 47,000 22,000 0 – 248,000 
20 6,400 0 – 64,000 79,000 0 – 821,000 
2.2.3. Additional Length of Stay 101 
The expert panel members provided lower and upper limits, lower and upper quartiles and a 102 
median estimate of the additional LoS following PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia of 8.0, 17.5, 10.5, 103 
14.5 and, 13.0 days respectively. Following occurrence of the scenario the cumulative numbers of 104 
additional LoS days over five- and 20-year periods were estimated to be 60,000 (95% CrI: 105 
2,600-875,000) and almost 200,000 days (95% CrI: 10,000-2,400,000), respectively (Table 4). 106 
Table 4: Point and interval estimates for the annual and cumulative additional days LoS attributable 107 
to PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia in the UK for selected years of the scenario. 108 
Year of 
scenario 
Annual Cumulative 
median 95% CrI median 95% CrI 
1 10,000 500 – 119,000 10,000 500 – 119,100 
5 60,000 2,600 – 875,000 170,000 8,000 – 2,400,000 
10 124,000 5,500 – 1,730,000 676,000 30,000 – 9,500,000 
20 195,000 10,000 – 2,400,000 2,440,000 120,000 – 31,900,000 
2.2.4. High-risk Patients  109 
Estimates of the number of PDR infections were made for the groups considered to be at high 110 
risk in this scenario. The incidence of SSI following large bowel surgery was estimated to rise from 111 
10% in year 0 of the scenario (baseline) to 12% and 18% in years 5 and 20, respectively: it was 112 
estimated that about 5,000 SSIs from PDR Gram-negative organisms attributable to the scenario 113 
would occur over the first five years. For non-elective hip replacement, and repair of fractured neck 114 
of femur it was estimated that about 200 and 400 attributable SSIs involving PDR Gram-negative 115 
organisms would occur over the first five years of the scenario.  116 
The impact upon other groups considered the attributable numbers of PDR Gram-negative 117 
bacteraemias and so, to some degree, overlapped with previous results. It was estimated that 118 
attributable numbers in year 5 of the scenario would be approximately 3,700 for patients undergoing 119 
flexible cystoscopies, 900 for patients with febrile neutropenia, 900 for renal transplantation, and 90 120 
for renal dialysis patients.  121 
3. Discussion 122 
We describe here a quantitative risk assessment that enabled both the likelihood and impact of 123 
a challenging, yet realistic, AMR scenario occurring in the UK to be estimated. The risk assessment 124 
focused on infections due to PDR Gram-negative bacteria as this is the clinical setting where the 125 
paucity of new or effective old antibiotics is likely to have the most impact. Evidence to inform the 126 
risk assessment was gathered by combining data from existing surveillance systems and expert 127 
opinion formally elicited from an expert multi-disciplinary panel of healthcare professionals. A 128 
Bayesian statistical analysis was carried out on the collected body of evidence in a manner designed 129 
to take account of both variability in the data and epistemic uncertainty in the expert opinion. 130 
Estimates of key measures of the healthcare and economic burden to society following the 131 
occurrence of the scenario were obtained over both five and twenty-year projected time-frames.  132 
The approach is not new; for example, Kennedy et al. [11] used a similar approach to quantify 133 
the risk of VTEC O157 infection from milk. However, to our knowledge it is the first time such an 134 
approach has been used to estimate the risk and impact of the advent of a PDR pathogen. Other 135 
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recent reviews of AMR [12,13] have used a range of scenarios, including those that are unrealistically 136 
at the extremes of 0% and 100% resistance across a range of pathogens. While these reviews 137 
concentrated on the global economic impact of AMR, the present UK study has a national focus. 138 
Furthermore, although those reviews supplemented available data with expert opinion, the 139 
uncertainty surrounding it was not taken into account. While all risk assessments are, by their 140 
nature, uncertain, in the present study the capturing of all sources of uncertainty, both within the 141 
expert panel elicitation and the available data, and their propagation into final estimates through 142 
Bayesian modelling, enabled a comprehensive assessment of the uncertainty surrounding the risk 143 
analysis. Consequently we were able to provide an interval estimate for the likelihood of the selected 144 
scenario occurring in the next five years of between 0.07 (~1/14) and 0.37 (~1/3), with a median 145 
estimate of 0.2 (~1/5). This likelihood is not negligible, and implies a reasonable expectation that 146 
persistence and spread of a PDR Gram-negative organism could occur over five years. In the longer 147 
term, this equates to an approximate 4% annual chance of the scenario starting in a given year. This 148 
in turn suggests that the likelihood over a 20-year period is around 0.8, highlighting the urgent need 149 
to take action and mitigate this risk through a range of measures, such as enhanced antibiotic 150 
stewardship and development of new generations of antibiotics and effective rapid diagnostics. 151 
Although from a global perspective surveillance data on AMR may be somewhat sparse, the 152 
UK is better served in this respect than many other nations. The likelihood estimate was derived 153 
using data from the BSAC Bacteraemia Surveillance Programme, which have been shown to closely 154 
mirror other national surveillance data collected from hospital microbiology laboratories around the 155 
UK [14]. These are subject to limitations in the sensitivity and specificity of resistance surveillance, 156 
and their use also assumes that historical observations of the persistence and spread of resistance are 157 
valid predictors in the context of future PDR. The potential for the rapid proliferation of 158 
near-pan-resistant clones is well illustrated by the expansion Klebsiella pneumoniae of clonal complex 159 
(CC) 258 producing KPC carbapenemases. These accounted for most of the early accumulation of 160 
carbapenem resistance among K. pneumoniae in Italy [15],where the proportion of 161 
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae rose from 2% in 2008 to 15% in 2010 then to 33% in 2014 [16]. 162 
Most representatives of this lineage remain susceptible to gentamicin, polymyxins and tigecycline, 163 
though around 16% - 22% have acquired resistance to any one of these agents [15].Although 164 
KPC-producing K. pneumoniae of CC258 have not yet spread within the UK, despite repeated 165 
introduction [17], the ‘pKpQIL’ plasmids that encode KPC in K. pneumoniae of CC258 that have 166 
spread widely in Israel [18] are highly related to the plasmids that are spreading among diverse 167 
Enterobacteriaceae in north-west England (PHE AMRHAI Reference Unit, Unpublished data). 168 
Additionally, there is growing evidence that KPC carbapenemases are now spreading beyond 169 
CC258-related K. pneumoniae in Italy, penetrating into a diversity of Klebsiella lineages, with an 170 
overall colistin resistance rate of 42% [19]. These observations highlight the plausibility of the 171 
conclusions reached in the present study. 172 
Point estimates of the cumulative numbers of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias over the first 173 
five and 20 years of the scenario were approximately 20,000 and 280,000, respectively. In the longer 174 
term we estimated approximately 80,000 attributable deaths among the 280,000 cases of bacteraemia. 175 
However, the propagation of all the uncertainty in the modelling inputs led to extremely wide 176 
credibility intervals around these central estimates. 177 
The estimates of impact necessarily use a number of simplifying assumptions. The projected 178 
increase in prevalence of PDR organisms (as a proportion of all Gram-negative bacteraemia isolates) 179 
from 0% in year 0 to a peak of approximately 26% in year 20 was determined by modelling the 180 
trajectory of increase in prevalence observed with CTX-M ESBLs in E. coli in the UK and 181 
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae in Italy and Greece, coupled with expert opinion. An 182 
assumption is made that this projected rise in PDR prevalence captures both the spread of 183 
pan-resistance and the increased propensity of PDR infections to give rise to bacteraemia as a result 184 
of ineffective treatment of underlying infection. The projected baseline number of Gram-negative 185 
infections over time, which was required to derive the numbers of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias 186 
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from their estimated prevalence, was derived from a simple longitudinal regression model of 187 
existing surveillance data. 188 
The numbers of deaths attributable to PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias and of additional 189 
hospital LoS days were estimated using data for multidrug-resistant E. coli bacteraemias as a proxy 190 
for PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias. In particular estimates of the numbers of attributable deaths 191 
will underestimate the true burden of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias, which is likely to be greater 192 
than for MDR E. coli. Expert elicitation was used to provide a means of assessing this bias and 193 
incorporate it into the model. The resulting figures were 1,900 (95% CrI: 0 - 23,000) and 6,400 (95% 194 
CrI: 0 - 64,000) over five and 20 years respectively. A lower credibility bound for the 30-day mortality 195 
odds ratio of zero might be regarded as implausible, given that the estimated number of PDR cases 196 
was never zero. However, this was a reflection of the uncertainty surrounding the opinion elicited 197 
from the expert panel on the odds ratio’s actual lower bound. 198 
Most of the estimates of incidence of infectious complications of medical procedures were based 199 
upon published data (though not all from the UK) applied to HES data from a single year. These 200 
estimates should be treated with caution, particularly as no credibility intervals around the central 201 
estimates were provided, and the range and frequency of medical procedures performed by the 202 
NHS may change over the 5-20 year time-scale considered here. 203 
An estimate of the number of cases of PDR infections at anatomical sites other than the 204 
bloodstream was projected using a published estimate of the ratio of Gram-negative bacteraemias to 205 
other Gram-negative infections [20]. This ratio of 9% would indicate that the total number of PDR 206 
infections may be 10-times greater than our estimates of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia. However, 207 
such extrapolations are highly uncertain: this ratio may change as a result of PDR, particularly if 208 
bacteraemias become relatively more common due to ineffective treatment of underlying infections 209 
at other body sites. 210 
The findings of this risk assessment indicate that there is a measurable risk of PDR pathogens 211 
emerging and becoming endemic in a matter of years. The prospect of widespread untreatable 212 
infections reinforces the urgent need for action to mitigate the risk of such an event occurring. 213 
Moreover, while the outcomes of this risk assessment were derived from an analysis of data and 214 
expert opinion relevant to the UK, the risk to public health posed by AMR is global in nature and 215 
other counties may face a similar level of risk. Thus the response to the threat of AMR needs to be 216 
international in scope [21]. To this end it is encouraging that Heads of State came together to commit 217 
to fighting the threat posed by AMR at the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2016 [22]. 218 
4. Materials and Methods 219 
4.1. Expert Panel and Remit 220 
The panel comprised members from academia, the National Health Service (NHS), Public 221 
Health England (PHE) and the UK Department of Health (DH), who variously had expertise in 222 
antimicrobial resistance, infectious disease epidemiology, clinical microbiology, pharmacy and 223 
patient safety. Their remit was threefold: firstly, to devise a scenario in which the level of antibiotic 224 
resistance in the UK made much of modern medicine untenable due to a high prevalence of 225 
untreatable infections; secondly, to assess the likelihood of this scenario occurring within a five year 226 
timeframe; and, lastly, to quantify the impact of this challenge over five- and twenty-year horizons. 227 
The panel considered a range of clinical settings, patient populations and pathogens most 228 
relevant to the above scenario. The key features envisioned were that a PDR and highly virulent 229 
Gram-negative bacterial strain enters or emerges in the UK, resulting in a loss of clinical utility of all 230 
available antibiotics. This resistance pattern would rapidly become geographically widespread, 231 
through a combination of strain spread along with intra- and inter-species transfer of a promiscuous 232 
plasmid encoding both the multi-resistance and virulence traits. Significant mitigation of the 233 
outbreak would not be possible due to failure of prevention and control measures to keep pace with 234 
the increasing scale of the problem, insufficient effectiveness of rapid diagnostics and unavailability 235 
of new agents for effective treatment. 236 
Antibiotics 2016, 5, x FOR PEER REVIEW  8 of 12 
4.2. Risk Assessment 237 
A Bayesian analytical approach was used, whereby information elicited from the panel was 238 
combined with available data (including published papers and unpublished surveillance data). The 239 
aim was to estimate the likelihood of such a scenario emerging within five years and to assess its 240 
subsequent impact over periods of five and twenty years. Aspects considered included affected 241 
patient groups, fatalities, excess morbidity and increased length of stay (LoS) in hospital. Outline 242 
methods are presented below, with statistical methodology available as Supplementary material.  243 
4.3. Expert Elicitation 244 
During early 2014, opinions on 11 key scenario descriptors (Parameters, Figure 3) were formally 245 
elicited from expert panel members in the form of probability distributions using the Sheffield 246 
Elicitation Framework (SHELF) [23] and the MATCH online elicitation tool [24]. For Parameters 1-5, 247 
which are defined as proportions, a “roulette” elicitation method was used, in which each panel 248 
member placed ten “chips” amongst as many equally-spaced “bins” spanning the 0 to 1 probability 249 
range. For the remaining Parameters a quartile method was employed, whereby panel members 250 
subjectively formulated median, upper and lower quartiles, together with plausible ranges. For each 251 
Parameter, distributions elicited from each panel member were thereafter combined into a pooled 252 
prior distribution; these distributions were subsequently discussed by all the panel members to reach 253 
a consensus prior summarizing the expert panel’s beliefs. 254 
4.4. Likelihood of the Scenario 255 
Assessment of the overall likelihood of the scenario was based on the combined probability of 256 
three sequential events, as shown in Equation 1, namely the emergence of PDR bacteria in the UK, 257 
their persistence and their subsequent widespread dissemination: 258 
 259 
Equation 1: Pr(scenario) = Pr(emergence) x Pr(persistence | emergence) x Pr(spread | emergence, persistence) 260 
 261 
where Pr(emergence) is the probability that a PDR organism enters or emerges in the UK at some 262 
point within five years and Pr(persistence | emergence) is the probability that, following such an event, 263 
the organism persists within the UK (i.e. it becomes endemic within a geographical area or setting). 264 
Once persistence is established, the final step is spread of the organism (Pr(spread | emergence, 265 
persistence)) such that it becomes widespread in the population, defined here as a peak annual 266 
proportion of resistance of at least 25%. The overall likelihood of the scenario is the product of the 267 
likelihood of each of these steps. 268 
Components of the likelihood were considered separately, combining the panel’s prior belief 269 
with data obtained from the bacteraemia arm of the BSAC Resistance Surveillance Project [25]. A 270 
Monte Carlo simulation approach was adopted to estimate the statistical models for the three above 271 
components to finally obtain the overall probability of the proposed scenario. 272 
4.5. Impact Assessment 273 
Evaluation of the impact of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia in terms of morbidity and 274 
mortality required two inputs for each year: the projected proportion of Gram-negative infections 275 
that were PDR, and the baseline number of Gram-negative bacteraemias. The expert panel’s view 276 
was that PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias would independently add to the baseline number of 277 
non-PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias. The proportion of PDR cases was informed by Parameters 5 278 
and 6 in Figure 3, and the baseline number of Gram-negative bacteraemias derived using Parameter 279 
11. Equation S3 (see Supplementary Material) was then used to generate estimates of the number of 280 
deaths directly attributable to PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia.  281 
 282 
 283 
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Parameter 1: What is the probability that PDR (resulting in loss of susceptibility to all 
remaining drug classes) in Gram-negative organisms will emerge in or enter the UK within 
the next five years (i.e. by 2019)? 
Parameter 2: In the UK, what proportion of drug class–bug resistance patterns become 
established, such that they persist over time? 
Parameter 3: In the UK, what proportion of established drug class–bug resistance patterns 
go on to become widespread*? 
Parameter 4: What is the overall probability that PDR will emerge in or enter the UK within 
the next five years, and become established and widespread? 
Parameter 5: During the scenario, what peak proportion of Gram-negative isolates will 
demonstrate PDR? 
Parameter 6: How many years will elapse from the emergence of PDR, until the peak 
proportion is reached? 
Parameter 7: What cumulative number of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia will occur 
during the first five years of the scenario (i.e. 2016-2020)? 
Parameter 8: What is the odds ratio for 30 day mortality amongst patients with PDR 
Gram-negative bacteraemia compared to similar patients with no infection? 
Parameter 9: By how many days is length of stay (LoS) greater amongst patients with PDR 
Gram-negative bacteraemia compared to similar patients with no infection? 
Parameter 10: Amongst various potential trajectories for the epidemic curve of PDR 
Gram-negative bacteraemia (defined in terms of peak prevalence, time to peak prevalence, 
and the presence or absence of a decline once the peak prevalence is reached), which is 
considered by the Expert Panel to be the most plausible? 
Parameter 11: In addition, panel members were asked to describe the trajectory by which the 
baseline number of Gram-negative bacteraemias (i.e. non-PDR Gram-negative bacteraemia) 
may be expected to change over time, to 2035. 
Figure 3: Parameters elicited from the expert panel 284 
4.6. Affected Patient Groups 285 
The impact of PDR infections would be highest in those patients whose vulnerability to 286 
infection is increased by aspects of their medical care, such as invasive procedures or 287 
immunosuppression. Patient groups included in the risk assessment were therefore those 288 
with/undergoing febrile neutropenia, renal dialysis, renal transplantation, flexible cystoscopy, large 289 
bowel surgery, hip replacement surgery or repair of fractured neck of femur.  Numbers of PDR 290 
Gram-negative infections expected in each of these groups were estimated for each year subsequent 291 
to the scenario. Projected estimates of the annual number of patients were made using Hospital 292 
Episode Statistics (HES) [26] for all groups apart from renal dialysis, which used data from the UK 293 
Renal Registry [27]. The incidences of Gram-negative infections for large bowel surgery, hip 294 
replacement surgery, and repair of fractured neck of femur were obtained from mandatory and 295 
voluntary surgical site infection (SSI) surveillance [28]. Incidence estimates from published literature 296 
were used for febrile neutropenia [29], renal transplantation [30], and flexible cystoscopy [31]. While 297 
no measures of accuracy were calculated, it was recognized that these estimates would exhibit a 298 
similar level of uncertainty to that shown by the numbers of PDR Gram-negative bacteraemias. 299 
4.7. Hospital Length of Stay 300 
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The total additional LoS in days (𝑆𝑖 ) attributable to PDR bacteraemias (𝑏𝑖 ) in year 𝑖  was 301 
calculated using the formula  𝑆𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖  x 𝐿 proposed by de Kraker [1], where 𝐿 is the additional LoS 302 
attributable to PDR bacteraemia described by Parameter 9 (Figure 3).  303 
5. Conclusions  304 
Many medical procedures predispose patients to infection by providing portals of entry for 305 
pathogens or by depressing patients’ immune responses. Thus, successful management of patients is 306 
frequently dependent of effective antibiotic prophylaxis or treatment. Given the paucity of new 307 
antibiotics in development, if resistance to currently available antibiotics becomes widespread, this 308 
will adversely impact on delivery of effective medical care in a wide range of clinical settings. This 309 
study describes a risk assessment that indicated that there is an approximately 20% chance of such a 310 
situation arising in the UK over a five year time frame. The impact of such an event, were it to occur, 311 
would be very significant in clinical and public health terms, with marked increases in morbidity 312 
and mortality. This finding reinforces the importance of taking immediate action to tackle the rise in 313 
antibiotic resistance.  314 
Supplementary Materials: Supplemental material giving detailed statistical methodology is available online at 315 
www.mdpi.com/link. The Supplemental material includes: Table S1, Numbers allocated to each elicitation 316 
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